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ARTICLES 
Bombs, Ballots, and Nationalism: 
Vieques and the Politics of Colonialism 
Pedro Caban 
RUTGERS UNIVERSITY 
The title of this essay refers to three enduring features of Puerto Rico's 
colonial encounter with the United States. "Bombs'' is a reference to the 
naval and aerial bombardment of Vieques, but it is also a metaphor for mil-
itarism and the repression of independence and nationalist movements in 
Puerto Rico. "Ballots" is a reference to the nonbinding plebiscite on Naval 
training in Vieques held in July 200 I, but it also captures the penchant for 
referenda and plebiscites on Puerto Rico's political status. "Nationalism,'' 
embodying the quest for sovereignty and autonomy in its various forms of 
political and cultural expression, is an irrepressible feature of Puerto Rican 
history and society. 
The current campaign to demilitarize and bring peace to Vieques is sig-
nificant because it is a singular episode in U.S.-Puerto Rico relations. While 
local opposition to the Navy's destructive use of Vieques is long-standing. 
until recently it was generally ignored in the United States. It is important to 
explore the array of factors that explain how a localized struggle. with lim-
ited organizational resources, forged a national consensus to acquire inter-
national notoriety, and succeeded in forcing the United States to reassess its 
treatment of Vieques. The struggle in Vieques has implications for alterna-
tive forms of resource mobilization by seemingly weak political actors to 
challenge the structures of colonial governance. But equally as important. 
the experience of resistance in Vieques yields lessons for other social move-
ments that confront oppressive structures and practices. 
In the following pages I will discuss two dimensions of the campaign to 
demilitarize Vieques. One dimension, of course, is colonialism and the his-
tory of Puerto Rican affirmation for political rights. The battle for Vieques is 
part of a century-old struggle by Puerto Ricans to liberalize the antidemo-
cratic structures of colonialism and attain a measure of autonomy over poli-
cy arenas that affect their lives. I discuss how the most recent struggle to 
demilitarize Vieques illuminates the contemporary practice of colonial rule 
and exposes the multiple arenas of resistance to this rule. The second dimen-
sion is the heightened presence of Puerto Rico in the U.S. national political 
discourse, particularly the growing awareness that the Puerto Rican experi-
ence is an essential feature of Latino political empowerment. 
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Vieques and U.S. Politics 
Vieques provides a set of lenses to reassess the role of Puerto Ricans in 
U.S. politics and highlights the emergence of national political mobilization 
based on an ethnically constituted notion of latinidad. Puerto Ricans have an 
electoral presence in such key electoral states as New York and Rorida and 
are emerging as strategic players in national politics. The struggle to demil-
itarize Vieques is of vital concern to the U.S. resident Puerto Rican popula-
tion because it is a dramatic affirmation of Puerto Rican national identity 
that is subsumed in a broader discourse of human rights and claims of citi-
zenship. This struggle has also revealed the changing nature of Puerto Rican 
national identity, an identity that extends beyond insularity to encompass the 
ideal of nonterritorially-bounded Puerto Rican consciousness. Opposition to 
the Navy presence in Vieques has evolved from acts of resistance by a hand-
ful of fishermen in small boats into an international social movement whose 
calls for justice, demilitarization, autonomy, and government accountability 
resonate with other Latina and Latino constituencies. 
The battle for Vieques represents another affirmation of nationalism that 
has been an inherent feature of Puerto Rico's political culture since at least 
the ill-fated 1868 Lares uprising to overthrow Spanish colonial rule. Just 
days before the attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center, the cam-
paign against the U.S. Navy seemed on the verge of success. The protest 
activities had escalated in scope, drama, and intensity. Some commentators 
portrayed the movement as a case of David fighting Goliath, a small, pow-
erless community in a virtual life struggle with the mighty U.S. military 
establishment. 
The Navy attempted to contain the protests by directing a misinforma-
tion campaign that rebuked the protesters as misguided Puerto Ricans who 
were cynically manipulated by independence advocates in order to embar-
rass the United States internationally. As the cause gained island-wide, then 
national and finally international support, the Navy deployed its full arsenal 
of repressive assets to quash the civil disobedience that disrupted its train-
ing. The physical intimidation and psychological abuse of the arrested pro-
testers, excessive jail sentences, use of harmful nonlethal weapons, a viru-
lent campaign to defame the movement's leadership, and surreptitious tac-
tics to disrupt and foment divisiveness were all deployed. Rather than intim-
idating the movement into submission, this gross retaliatory action actually 
generated increased sympathy and support for the protesters and their cause. 
Only the horrific terrorist events of September 11, 2001 moved most organ-
izations engaged in the demilitarization campaign to impose a voluntary 
moratorium on their activities. In the context of the patriotic outburst that 
consumed a grief-stricken nation that wanted vengeance, opposition to mil-
itary training in the name of fighting terrorism was almost treasonous. 
While the battle of Vieques appears quiescent for the moment, the forces 
that gave rise to it are still very much alive. The grassroots organizations that 
spearheaded the movement are very active and have not wavered from their 
resolve to resist the Navy's bombardment of Vieques. The Navy Department 
appears as determined as ever not to relinquish Vieques, its ··crown jewel" 
for conducting weapons training and maneuvers. Yet the Bush administra-
tion seems convinced that come election time the Republican Party will be 
judged by the Latino electorate for its handling of the Vieques debacle and 
its treatment of the Puerto Rican protesters. 
Before discussing the struggle to demilitarize Vieques in both its colonial 
and U.S. domestic political dimensions, I want to comment on two seeming 
paradoxes of the Puerto Rican situation. Although over 7 million Puerto 
Ricans reside in their nation and in the United States, they have been por-
trayed as peripheral political actors who do not factor into the calculus of 
policy makers or the electoral strategies of the Republican or Democratic 
Parties. The second paradox concerns continued U.S. insistence on the indis-
pensability of Puerto Rico as a strategic asset despite the collapse of the 
Soviet Union over a decade ago, the end of insurrections in Central and 
Latin America, and the virtual irrelevance of Cuba as a regional force. The 
unintended consequence of the movement to expel the Navy from Vieques 
has been to expose these paradoxes to critical scrutiny and to reveal their 
casuistry. 
The Paradox of Pol itica I Inefficacy 
Puerto Ricans have historically been represented as inconsequential ac-
tors in U.S. society and polity. Puerto Ricans who live on the island have 
been treated as a subject people who have no voice in the decision-making 
process in Washington. Since 1898 Congress, acting under the authority of 
the territorial clause of the Constitution, has had plenary powers to admin-
ister Puerto Rico. As a territory Puerto Rico is denied representation in Con-
gress and its people are precluded from voting in U.S. presidential elections. 
Consequently, Puerto Rico's capacity to shape policies that directly and 
immediately affect its people through formal channels is minimal. Histor-
ically, Puerto Rican input into the policy process in the federal government 
has either been improvised and informal or by invitation. Yet, an important 
achievement of the Vieques campaign, even if it turns out to be fleeting, was 
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to dramatically dispel detrimental portrayals of Puerto Ricans as a people 
who lack the will and capacity to affect politics and policy making at the 
U.S. national level. Although as colonial subjects they are denied a formal 
role in the national political process, Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens and 
have employed that legal distinction to influence policy. 
Puerto Ricans who reside in the United States have been portrayed as a 
politically marginalized and poverty-stricken racialized minority that lacks 
agency. Generally low socioeconomic status and educational attainment 
levels correlate with the low levels of electoral engagement, not only for 
Puerto Ricans but for all racialized minorities. However, impediments inten-
tionally designed to discourage electoral participation also affect participa-
tion. But the long-standing absence of Puerto Ricans from domestic politi-
cal discourse and activity is not merely a consequence of their voting char-
acteristics. More recently, Puerto Ricans are represented as forming part of 
a homogeneous Latino population. In the popular imagery Puerto Ricans 
become indistinguishable from other Latinos and they are often thought of 
as either recent immigrants or temporary workers who lack U.S. citizenship. 
The image of Puerto Ricans as "foreign" is reinforced in official discourse. 
George W. Bush's reference in June 2001 to the U.S. citizens of Puerto Rico 
as "our friends and neighbors" reaffirmed this image of Puerto Ricans as 
foreigners. The ambiguity of the Puerto Rican political identity and the pub-
lic representation of Puerto Ricans as peripheral to the events and forces that 
shape U.S. society are constructions designed to deprive a people of a sense 
of history and agency. 
However, the images of the irrelevant colonial subject and inconsequen-
tial racialized minority are profoundly ahistorical characterizations. A histo-
ry of Puerto Rican activism belies the image of a people who lack political 
will or capacity for decisive action. Puerto Rican demands for access and 
equity are derivative of Puerto Rico's subordinate territorial status and denial 
of representation. The Vieques movement, which includes solidarity net-
works in Puerto Rican and Latino neighborhoods throughout the United 
States, serves to further rupture the imagery of an acquiescent people who 
countenance their subjugation under colonialism. Amflcar Barreto observes 
in his study of Puerto Rican politics and Vieques, that the particularly im-
pressive feature of the movement was not only the alliance of grassroots 
organizations, political parties, and the state in Puerto Rico, "but also the 
active involvement of Puerto Ricans living in the continental United States." 
These bonds demonstrated a vibrant cultural nationalism that transcended 
territory. From Washington's perspective, Puerto Rican nationalists "were 
living among us" (Barreto 2002, 64 ). 
It is not only the history of resistance. but the sheer size of the Puerto 
Rican population itself that defies attempts to represent them as extraneous 
to the political process. The nearly 3.4 million Puerto Ricans who reside in 
the United States comprise almost I 0 percent of the Latino population. 
Another 3.8 million live in Puerto Rico. In fact, it is the remarkably deluso-
ry quality of these assertions- the facts plainly defy the depiction- that 
prompts one to reject the conventional representation of the marginality of 
Puerto Ricans and to rethink traditional approaches to the study of Puerto 
Rico political engagement and agency. Thus it is understandable that. de-
spite the myth of powerlessness. the leadership of the Republican and 
Democratic Parties is heedful of the growing salience of the Latino vote and 
courting it aggressively. 
Puerto Ricans have been engaged in a century-old struggle to decolonize 
their island nation. In fact, Puerto Rican politics is often depicted as ob-
sessed with resolving the island's territorial status. Independence advocates 
have called for international mediation to resolve Puerto Rico's colonial sta-
tus and challenged the U.S. government's position that this is a purely 
domestic political matter. They have made the case that Puerto Rico's colo-
nialism is an international issue in hopes of bringing world pressure to bear 
on the United States. The quest for independence has been pursued by grass-
roots solidary groups, clandestine militant groups, student and political 
movements, and diverse political parties. including the Puerto Rican Inde-
pendence Party (PIP) and now defunct Socialist and Nationalist Parties. The 
United Nations Decolonization Committee, Amnesty International. mem-
bers states of the United Nations, the Socialist International, the Non-
Aligned Movement and other organizations of international scope have 
called at various times on the United States to respect the right of Puerto 
Ricans to self-determination. 
Many U.S. resident Puerto Ricans have been actively engaged in the 
independence movement and have worked closely with island-based groups. 
While the Young Lords is the most recognized stateside organization that 
took up the cause of independence, other solidarity groups have advocated 
for Puerto Rican independence. The independence movement, given its will-
ingness to openly confront and defy U.S. authority and its resourcefulness in 
seeking strategic alliances globally, dispels the image that Puerto Ricans 
have passively accepted colonial rule. 
The Vieques movement represents a legacy of community-based resist-
ance that finds parallels with earlier environmental and antimilitarism cam-
paigns in Puerto Rico. But in contrast to these earlier campaigns, it has suc-
cessfully avoided being drawn into the intem1inable and ruinous politics of 
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territorial status. Although undeniably another episode of political assertion 
and opposition to U.S. rule, the battle for Vieques is a struggle for social jus-
tice and human rights, public health and safety, sustainable development and 
environmental protection, demilitarization, autonomy and government 
accountability. 
The depiction of Puerto Ricans as colonized subjects who, despite occa-
sional acts of political desperation, lack agency is contradicted by a history 
of activism and political engagement in Puerto Rico and the United States. 
The Paradox of Strategic Indispensability 
Over the last century the array of geopolitical concerns, ranging from 
European expansionism to national liberation insurrections in Latin Amer-
ica, that made Puerto Rico an indispensable strategic asset has disappeared. 
Yet, for the United States, Puerto Rico's strategic significance for national 
security remains undiminished. It is paradoxical that, despite these momen-
tous changes, the Pentagon persists in treating Puerto Rico as a military asset 
it can unilaterally deploy in national defense. Although forcefully taken from 
Spain in 1898 for strategic reasons, it was not until the outbreak of World 
War II that Puerto Rico was assigned a cardinal role in hemispheric defense 
policy. During World War II the War Department converted Puerto Rico into 
an island fortress and enhanced its capacity to serve as a forward base of de-
fense for the Panama Canal. In 1941 the Navy expropriated most of Vieques 
and prepared it as a home base for the British Navy in the event Great Britain 
was defeated by Germany. Hundreds of millions of federal dollars, an un-
precedented amount, flowed into the island for construction of military and 
naval bases and airports. 
Puerto Rico's military utility did not diminish after the war. In fact, the 
island-nation has served as training and staging area for the U.S. military 
forces and its surrogates. Its military installations were employed in the Bay 
of Pigs invasion and subsequent invasions of the Dominican Republic, 
Grenada, and Panama. Ironically, as conventional military threats to U.S. 
security in the region subside, Puerto Rico's value as military real estate has 
increased (see AFSC 1999). Since the closure of U.S. military bases in 
Panama, the Pentagon has consolidated virtually all of its Latin American 
and Caribbean military command structure in Puerto Rico. The U.S. 
Southern Command moved its operations from Panama to Roosevelt Roads 
in 1999. The U.S. Army South, another command component, also relocat-
ed its operations to Fort Buchanan. U.S. Southern Command's director, 
General Wilhelm, stated in June 1999 that, "Puerto Rico will now assume 
the role that Panama has had for Southern Command for about the last fifty 
years. Puerto Rico will really become the hub of our operations" (quoted in 
AFSC I 999). Puerto Rico currently has the largest standing concentration of 
U.S. military forces outside the United States. The Roosevelt Roads com-
plex, which includes Vieques, is currently the largest U.S. military base. Fort 
Buchanan is another key military installation and the headquarters for U.S. 
Army South. The I 0,000-acre Camp Santiago serves as a National Guard 
training facility. Approximately 14 per cent of Puerto Rico's land mass is 
under the supervision or authority of U.S. armed forces. 
Since the threats of communist expansion and Cuban aggression have 
been invalidated as rationales for the continued militarization of Puerto 
Rico, the Pentagon has devised a new thesis to justify its presence on the 
island (see Garda Munoz and Rodriguez Beruff 1999). According to the 
Pentagon, nontraditional threats to regional stability and democracy include 
narcotics trade, illegal immigration, drug money laundering, terrorism, nat-
ural disasters, and "the open-ended threat of critical uncertainties" (AFSC 
I 999). Given its geographical location and relationship to the United States, 
Puerto Rico is strategically positioned to respond to this array of threats. 
With the installation of the "Relocatable Over-the-Horizon Radar" 
(ROTHR) in Vieques and Fort Allen to detect narcotics smuggling flights in 
South America, Puerto Rico has been converted into a front line state in 
combating narco- trafficking. 
In its zeal to retain Vieques for weapons training, the N;wy has dismissed 
credible arguments that contravene its inflated claims that the island is an 
incomparable facility essential to maintaining national security. According 
to former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson, "Viequcs is an 
irreplaceable asset ... it's the crown jewel of combined arms, live-fire train-
ing. It's the world standard" (U.S. House of Representatives June 27, 200 I). 
Yet other experts report with equal certainty that the actual tactics employed 
in hundreds of engagements, since the last hostile amphibious assault in bat-
tle of Inchon in Korea in 1950, are unrelated to the type of combined 
amphibious, naval bombardment, and aerial strafing training exercises con-
ducted in Vieques. 
Admiral John J. Shanahan, a former commander of the U.S. Second 
Fleet, declared that "I cannot support the Navy claims that Vieques is criti-
cal for predeployment Navy and Marine Corps training, and that training 
obtained at Vieques cannot be duplicated elsewhere." He challenged the 
assertion that Vieques is invaluable for Navy preparedness and testified that 
"the current training on Vieques is neither unique, nor in most instances nec-
essary for modern amphibious warfare" (quoted in Puerto Rico Governor 
1999). Rear Admiral Eugene Carrol has argued that the Navy continues to 
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adhere to doctrine of military engagement that is archaic and inappropriate 
for u...,c in modem warfare (Carroll 2001; see Smith 2001 ). President Bush's 
surprising decision to suspend training exercises in January 2002, in the midst 
of the U.S. war on international terrorism, seems to dampen the Navy's 
claims that weapons training in Vieques is indispensable for military pre-
paredness. 
The Pentagon's contemptuous refusal to relinquish Vieques is a reflection 
of its barely suppressed racist attitude that the island is populated by a polit-
ically inconsequential community. But in addition, the Navy reasons that as a 
territorial possession, Puerto Rico and its people have no standing to object to 
the military use of their land, nor to interfere with the conduct of its activities. 
The Battle for Vieques: Antecedents 
The campaign to demilitarize Vieques exposes many dimensions of Puer-
to Rico's history under U.S. colonial rule. It reveals the relationship between 
militarism and repression of dissent, between imperial rule and the persist-
ence of nationalism, and exposes the fallacy that the popular will as expressed 
through the ballot box will alter the exercise of colonial. But events in 
Vieques also demonstrate how grassroots organizations have been able to cir-
cumvent colonialism's restrictions on political and civil rights. The denial of 
representation in the federal government compels Puerto Ricans to pursue 
other forms of political activity to influence the policy process. For these rea-
sons Vieques assumes significance for understanding contemporary politics, 
particularly the politics of marginalized sectors of the population. 
Resistance to the Navy's military activities in Vieques and efforts to hold 
the federal government accountable for the economic and environmental 
despoliation on the island span almost five decades. The current campaign 
began in 1993. In August 1941, under the authority granted by Public Law 
247, the Navy Department began a process of land expropriation. By the end 
of the decade it controlled 26,000 of 33,000 acres and had dislocated thou-
sands of viequenses (see Ayala). Under the guise of national security and mil-
itary preparedness, the Navy Department persistently sought to expropriate 
the remaining acreage and dispossess the population from Vieques- a popu-
lation whose activism has been a continuous source of irritation to the mili-
tary authorities. 
In 1947, Governor Jesus T. Pinero, of the Partido Popular Democnitico 
(PPD), vigorously challenged a Navy proposal to expropriate the remaining 
acreage and to relocate its residents to the island of St. Croix, part of the U.S. 
Virgin Islands. In 1961 the Navy again sought to depopulate Vieques and con-
ven the island inro its exclusive training facility by forcefully relocating its 
8.000 residents to St. Croix. PPD Governor Mufioz Marin appealed to 
President Kennedy to order the Defense Department to abandon the plan. 
which he termed "drastic, destructive and dangerous" and which would 
result in "the destruction of a community" (Melendez Lopez 2000, 188-89). 
Although its plan was rejected, the Navy was able to obtain congressional 
approval in 1964 to expropriate an additional 1,434 acres along the southern 
shore. Yieques Mayor Antonio Rivera and the newly created Committee to 
Recover Yieques strenuously resisted the attempted expropriation and even-
tually prevailed. Rivera lamented, "it is almost as if there was a master plan 
to strangle our economy and throw us into the sea'' (San Juan Review 1964 ). 
Protest activities with the aim of demilitarizing Culebra, Yieques' sister 
island, began in 1967. Initially led by the Asociacion de Pescadores de 
Culebra [Culebra's Fishermen Association], the struggle attracted the sup-
port of the Puerto Rican Independence Party (PIP) and the Socialist Party 
(Barreto 2002, 28). At the request of Governor Carlos Romero Barcelo, the 
United States Conference of Mayors also adopted a policy in 1972 to sup-
port efforts to terminate live firing training in Culebra. The Culebra cam-
paign gained the formal support of the Democratic Party which pledged in 
its 1972 Party Platform "to end all Naval shelling and bombardment of the 
tiny, inhabited island of Culebra and its neighboring keys, no later than June 
I, 1975" (Democratic Party 1972). Local protests against the Na"y contin-
ued unabated and were gaining wide media coverage. To mollify the pro-
testers, President Ford ordered the Secretary of Defense to conduct a study 
of weapons training in Culebra. The study recommended that the Secretary 
of Defense decide by the end of 1972 on an alternate naval training facility. 
However, he chose to disregard the recommendations and did not terminate 
military training. 
A potential catastrophe, the unscheduled mortar barrage that landed on a 
beach where children were playing, finally compelled Ford to order the 
Navy to relinquish its control of Culebra on July I, 1975. Unbridled outrage 
from all sectors of Puerto Rican society over the Navy Department's flagrant 
disregard for Puerto Rican lives was too much for Ford to ignore. The Navy 
Department reorganized its Atlantic Fleet Training Center and concentrated 
all its weapons training in Vieques. A recent Defense Department report con-
firmed that "the transfer of training activities from Culebra to Vieques in the 
1970s generated significant controversy, including organized protests" (U.S. 
Office of the President 1999). While victory in Culebra had a devastating 
impact on Vieques, it also spurred a grassroots protest campaign to disrupt 
Naval training on that island as well. 
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The emergence of the pro-statehood Partido Nuevo Progresista (PNP) in 
1968 brought the period of PPD political hegemony to an end, and injected 
a new dimension to the politics of demilitarizing Vieques. The PNP attempt-
ed to recast the debacle over Vieques as a nonpartisan matter of citizenship 
rights and national dignity. From 1978 through 1983 the PNP supported the 
campaign to expel the Navy from Vieques (McCaffrey 1999, 330). State-
hood advocates joined independentistas in making the case that the PPD's 
utter failure to restrain the Navy was a consequence of Puerto Rico's colo-
nial status. According to former Governor Pedro Rossell6, "the problem of 
Vieques is a manifestation of the failure to resolve Puerto Rico's political 
status." While the commonwealth status gives Puerto Rico authority over 
local matters, "the activities of the military are not a local matter. This is a 
decision of the (United States) national government, and Puerto Rico does 
not have a vote there" (El Nuevo Dia March 28, 2001). The PNP claimed 
that political equality through the grant of statehood was a precondition for 
effectively confronting U.S. military use of Puerto Rico in general, and 
Vieques in particular. The decision by the PNP, an avowedly pro-U.S., polit-
ically conservative organization, to support the Vieques protesters under-
mined the Navy's baseless declarations that the anti-militarization protests 
were devoid of merit and cynically orchestrated by radical independence 
advocates. By 1990, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and Cuba's eco-
nomic meltdown, the argument that terminating Naval training in Vieques 
was a security threat lost all credibility. 
The PIP described colonialism as the root cause of the Navy's ignoble 
treatment of the people and government of Puerto Rico. Without self-deter-
mination the Navy could not be forced to vacate Vieques and the civil and 
human rights of its residents would continue to be trampled. Like the PNP, 
the PIP also saw Vieques as an ideological and political battleground to 
advance its objectives. But by late 1990s the anti militarization campaign 
had evolved into a social movement imbued with a cultural nationalist char-
acter, and was resolute in its determination to evict the Navy and restore 
peace and dignity to the people of Vieques. 
Opposition to the Navy's presence in Vieques occurred between 1978 
and 1983, and commenced again in 1993. In 1978 the Vieques Fisherman's 
Association successfully halted a naval bombardment when it positioned a 
flotilla of small fishing boats in the line of fire of NATO warships. The dra-
matic and dangerous act of defiance generated international attention and 
precipitated the building of a broad-based coalition that included solidarity 
networks throughout the United States. The battle for Vieques became a 
national issue and a Vieques Support Network was set up in 1978 which 
---------
worked through 1983 coordinating action in various U.S. cities (McCaffrey 
1999, 330). The fishermen and activists from the Crusade for the Rescue of 
Vieques continued to intenupt Navy training activities through 1979. In 
response to increasing public pressure. PNP Governor Romero Barcelo filed 
suit on March 1978 to enjoin the Navy from conducting training operations 
in Vieques. 
However, this legal maneuver did not dissuade the protesters. One of the 
tirst land invasions took place in May 1979. when protesters occupied Playa 
Caracas in an effort to block an amphibious landing. Twenty-one protesters 
were arrested; one was incarcerated in a Tallahassee. Florida jail and was 
found dead in his cell in November 1979. while awaiting trial. The ensuing 
outcry in the aftermath of the young man's mysterious death moved the U.S. 
House Armed Services Committee in December 1979 to appoint a panel to 
examine "Puerto Rico's perspective on the Navy's presence on Vieques" and 
to explore alternative sites in which to conduct training. The committee was 
split; three members recommended an alternative site. while two disagreed 
that a new site was necessary (U.S. Office of the President 1999. I). Protest 
activities continued and eventually convinced the Navy Department to sign 
a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Governor Romero Barcelo in 
1983. The Navy Department affirmed that it "recognizes its obligation to he 
a good neighbor to the people of Vieques and will continue to strive to 
improve the welfare of the island's people" (Barreto 2002, 31 ). In return. 
Romero Barcelo withdrew the Puerto Rican government's lawsuit. With the 
signing of the MOU the local protest movements abated significantly, and 
solidarity work in the United States on behalf of Vieques died down (see 
McCaffrey 1998). However, in 1989, after it became apparent that the Navy 
was explicitly ignoring the terms of the accord, the viequenses organized the 
Constitutional Assembly of the Great Council of Vieques to plan for a 
renewed campaign to expel the Navy. 
Vieques and the Clinton Years 
Faced with continued Navy's disregard for the health and safety of their 
community, Vieques' residents developed a new organization and strategy 
of resistance. In March 1993, they established the Comite Pro Rescate Y 
Desarrollo de Vieques (CPRDV) [Committee for the Rescue and Devel-
opment of Vieques]. The CPRDV was a community based, nonpartisan 
organization "for the purpose of obtaining permanent end to the bomb-
ing ... and [which] seeks the withdrawal of all military forces from Vieques" 
(CPRDV 1999). Like its predecessor, the Crusade for the Rescue of 
Vieques, the CPRDV shunned ties with the political parties and, instead, 
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sought alliances with national and international solidarity networks commit-
ted to peace and justice, the environment, and demilitarization. Local hostil-
ity to the Navy's presence escalated dramatically on October 24, 1993, when 
a fighter bomber missed its intended target by 10 miles, and dropped its pay-
load of live bombs approximately one mile from the main town of Isabel 
Segunda. The Navy's indifference to the event contributed to growing Puerto 
Rican indignation. Aerial attacks by novice pilots resulted in another acci-
dental bombing on April 19, 1999, this time of a manned observation post. 
David Sanes Rodriguez, a civilian security guard, was killed and four other 
civilians were seriously injured in this mishap. 
Two days after the bombing Navy opponents launched a broad-based 
campaign of civil disobedience, protests, and invasions of the restricted 
areas at Camp Garcfa (the western third of Vieques island). The CPRDV, 
other community-based organizations, the PIP, religious organizations and 
church groups, university students, and local politicians engaged in acts of 
civil disobedience by establishing over a dozen encampments in the restrict-
ed weapons training area. Protest marches and demonstrations in solidarity 
with Vieques were organized by Puerto Ricans in the United States. In re-
sponse to the outpouring of rage over Sanes Rodriguez's killing, PNP Gov-
ernor Rossell6 established a special committee on May 11, 1999, to study 
conditions on Vieques. The committee's report reaffirmed that the Navy had 
not honored the 1983 accords (Puerto Rico: Governor 1999 ). I According to 
Rosse1l6, the military activity had caused "disastrous economic and envi-
ronmental damage and ... violated the human and constitutional rights of the 
residents of Vieques" (Yarrow). 
The special committee demanded that the Navy immediately cease all 
military activities on the island and decontaminate and transfer the land it 
had expropriated to the people of Vieques. Rossel16 adopted the recommen-
dations as the official position of the government. On July 4, 1999, a week 
after the release of the report, a protest march drew 50,000 people to the 
Roosevelt Roads military base in Ceiba. Possibly for the first time in Puerto 
Rico's history, a national consensus on Vieques that included the leadership 
of all the political parties and the multifarious organizations of civil society, 
and Puerto Rican and Latino organizations in the United States seemed pos-
sible. For Robert Rabin, a representative of the CPRDV, the civil disobedi-
ence galvanized by the once unthinkable notion of resisting the claims of the 
U.S. war machine was a historical moment: "Hundreds of people across the 
spectrum- fishermen, housewives, schoolteachers, political leaders- are 
united by an issue for the first time" (Clines 1999). Barreto correctly inter-
prets this unprecedented consensus as a manifestation of deep-seated, but 
latent. Puerto Rican cultural nationalism. The determination of Puerto 
Ricans, on the island as well as in the continental United States, to resist the 
Navy was rooted in a fervent cultural identity as a collective national subject 
and undoubtedly alarmed "powerful interests in the metropolis" (Barreto 
2002, 64). 
On Rossello' s request President Clinton appointed a special panel on 
June 9. 1999, to explore the feasibility of alternative locations for weapons 
training. The Senate Armed Services Committee, which opposed terminat-
ing Navy use of Vieques, immediately called for hearings. While critical of 
Clinton's actions, the committee was obligated to hear testimony from PNP 
Resident Commissioner Romero Barcelo. He testified that the Navy's 
"actions not only constitute a callous disregard, but a flagrant and crass vio-
lation of both the terms and spirit of the Memorandum of Understanding" 
(Romero Barcelo Sept. 22, 1999 ). Governor Rossello also testified that "we 
have reached the limit of our patience. after nearly six decades of empty 
promises, unreliable pledges and broken assurances." He warned that "we. 
the people of Puerto Rico, have graduated from colonial passivity. Never 
again shall we tolerate abuse of the magnitude and scope the likes of which 
no community in any of the 50 states would ever be asked to tolerate." 
Rossello testified that any proposal that failed to include the immediate 
cessation of hostilities against Vieques would be rejected. He admonished. 
"You don't negotiate with human rights" (Puerto Rico Governor 1999). The 
Special Panel on Military Operations on Vieques issued its report on October 
18, 1999. It noted that "the relationship between the Navy and residents of 
Vieques, and the people of Puerto Rico had reached crisis proportions even 
prior to the tragic death of David Sanes Rodriguez" (2). The panel called on 
the Navy to review its training needs in Vieques with the objective of termi-
nating its activities within five years. 
Throughout 1999 the CPRDV and PIP spearheaded an aggressive and 
highly publicized campaign to disrupt Navy operations in Vieques. Its rep-
resentatives traveled throughout the United States, Europe, and Asia to gen-
erate support. The Socialist International proclaimed its support for Vieques 
and its membership, comprised of leading European heads of state, elected 
PIP president Ruben Berrios as its president. The Vieques movement attract-
ed the support of Latino organizations, religious groups, and community-
based organizations throughout United States. Newsweek reported that 
"Latinos waged a state-of-the-art campaign aimed at running the Navy out 
of Vieques" (Campo-Flares 2001 ). Pressured to act by the escalating pro-
tests, increased international attention, and effective lobbying by important 
Latino organizations, President Clinton instructed Defense Secretary Cohen 
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on June 9, 1999. to establish a panel to assess the necessity of Vieques for 
continued operations and to explore alternative sites. 
In the interim, the Senate Armed Services Committee convened hearings 
that were designed to put forth the Navy's position that "it would be irre-
sponsible to deploy our naval forces" without training in Vieques (Cong. 
Rec. Nov. 19, 1999). Senator Inhofe, an ardent advocate for the Navy, argued 
against Clinton's moratorium on bombing and reported that we "would 
encourage him, for the lives of Americans" to continue training in Vieques 
(Cong Rec. Nov. 18, 1999). Earlier, in September 1999, lnhofe had spon-
sored punitive legislation to close the Roosevelt Roads military base in the 
event live weapons training was terminated in Vieques (the base generates 
2,500 civilian jobs and pumps about $300 million into the local economy). 
The Hispanic Coalition for Puerto Rico's Self-Determination, comprised of 
six prominent national Latino organizations, rebuked the Senate for its treat-
ment of Puerto Rico and warned that "U.S. Hispanics deplore the manner in 
which Puerto Rico has been threatened with economic reprisals by some 
senators. This is not the way to be treating people who have served valiant-
ly in the defense of our country" (Puerto Rico Herald 2000). 
Secretary Cohen's December 3, 1999, letter to Clinton recommended 
continued training at reduced levels with the use of inert ordnance and ter-
mination of the Navy's activities in Vieques within five years (Cohen 1999). 
Cohen also recommended establishing upon resumption of live fire training, 
a 40 million dollar community and economic development program. Clinton 
endorsed the report the same day, but his decision was immediately rejected 
by all parties engaged in the Vieques campaign. Rossello denounced the plan 
as "unacceptable for the people of Puerto Rico and the people of Vieques" 
(CNN 1999). Resident Commissioner Romero Barcelo penned an angry let-
ter to Clinton indicting the Navy for a legacy of deceit and unscrupulous 
behavior toward the people of Puerto Rico. He protested, "The proposal is 
indeed a slap in the face to all Puerto Rican-Americans" and declared that it 
was "offensive to dangle financial incentives to disenfranchised and impov-
erished American citizens" (Romero Barcelo Dec. 9, 1999).2 
On January 31, 2000 Clinton, again sought to defuse the increasingly 
tense Vieques situation by issuing a presidential directive that authorized a 
referendum by February 22, 2001 (subsequently amended first to November 
2001, and then to January 2002) of the registered voters of Vieques on 
whether to terminate all Navy training by May 1, 2003, or to reinstate live 
ordnance training. As an inducement for the second option, the federal gov-
ernment agreed to provide an additional 50 million dollars for "housing and 
enhancement of infrastructure" in Vieques. Clinton ordered that training be 
confined to non-explosive ordnance until the referendum was conducted 
(U.S. Office of the President 2000). To the profound astonishment of most 
Puerto Ricans, Governor Rossell6 endorsed the directive "as a fair and pos-
itive basis for resolution of a long standing and complex issue." He also 
guaranteed that his administration would not initiate litigation that would 
constrain training and would "support Federal efforts to assure that tres-
passing ... ceased entirely" (Bums 2000). On the floor of the U.S. House of 
Representatives, Romero Barcelo announced that "as the sole elected repre-
sentative of the four million American residents in Puerto Rico, I support the 
agreement" (Cong. Rec. April 13, 2000). 
Virtually the entire Vieques movement regarded Rossello's decision as a 
devastating betrayal. The announcement effectively ruptured the national 
consensus that had informally emerged on Vieques. On February 4, 2000, the 
Coordinating Committee for Peace and Justice in Vieques, a coalition of 
civic, environmental, student, religious and political organizations, including 
the PPD and the PIP, denounced the accord. CPRDV issued a statement 
declaring that Rossell6 had betrayed the people of Vieques, and vowed that 
it would block Naval training by conducting a campaign of civil disobedi-
ence in the firing ranges. On February 21 approximately 150,000 people 
held a boisterous rally and march in San Juan called by religious leaders to 
register popular repudiation of the Clinton-Rossell6 accord. 
Apprehensive that the massive popular demonstration would be inter-
preted in Washington as a repudiation of the party, the PNP countered by 
organizing its own rally and march. While conceived to demonstrate to 
Washington that the PNP still enjoyed broad-based support, the event also 
sought to assuage nervous politicians in the United States that the February 
outpouring of Puerto Rican national pride was not an act of anti-Ameri-
canism. Approximately 90,000 marched in the PNP-sponsored event March 
2, to celebrate the anniversary of the 1917 Jones Act, which conferred Puerto 
Ricans U.S. citizenship. The national consensus on Vieques, which had 
evolved as a nonideological, nationally-based campaign for human rights 
and environmental justice, had fallen victim to the traditional partisan poli-
tics of status. 
Two months later, after the Rossell6 administration had proven unable to 
resolve the Vieques debacle, the Clinton administration acted against the 
protesters. On May 4, 2000, 300 U.S. federal marshals, backed up by 1,200 
Marines, descended on Vieques and cleared protesters from the entrance to 
Camp Garcia, while FBI SWAT teams broke up the peace encampments. 
Approximately 216 protesters, all whom adhered to nonviolent civil disobe-
dience, were detained and released. Throughout the year and well into 2002, 
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opponents of the Navy continued their forays into the restricted ar:as and 
served as human shields to disrupt training. On May I 0. 2000, Bernos was 
arrested for entering the restricted bombing area. This was followed by a 
coordinated campaign by the PIP to disrupt the bombings which resulted in 
the arrest of 129 party members. On 1 une 27, twenty protesters entered the 
range by sea, while another I 06 attempted to penetrate the camp ba.rriers. 
The CPRDV reported in an August 3. 2000 press release that "Despite the 
small Berlin Wall the Navy builds to separate the military and civilian sec-
tors of Vieques, our people have entered the restricted area for reconnais-
sance missions over the past weeks" and threatened to escalate its civil dis-
obedience campaign. 
The election of PPD gubernatorial candidate Sila Calderon on 
November 7, 2000, was widely interpreted as a stunning rejection of the 
PNP for Rossell6's accord with Clinton. During the election campaign 
Calderon emerged as a vigorous and uncompromising advocate for the im-
mediate termination of weapons training in Vieques and withdrawal of the 
Navy (see Barreto 2002, Chapter 5 ). She refused to support the Clinton di-
rective and announced that if elected the Puerto Rican government would 
take legal action against the Navy. Calderon also promised to hold a local 
referendum to give the residents of Vieques the option of voting for the 
immediate termination of naval training. Since the referendum was not 
binding on the federal government, it was largely a symbolic, but nonethe-
less significant gesture to increase pressure on the Navy. She also pledged 
50 million dollars in economic aid to Vieques during a four-year period. 
These pledges, if honored, would have eviscerated the Rossell6-Clinton 
accord (see Marino 2000). 
Fearful that Puerto Ricans would vote in the planned November 2002 
referendum to permanently end training operations in Vieques, Clinton sent 
Secretary Cohen a memo on January I 9, 200 I (his last day in office) re-
questing that Cohen identify alternatives to live ordnance training on 
Vieques. He warned that "A new governor, legislative majority and mayor 
have recently taken office .... They have also pledged to take actions that 
would be inconsistent with the resolution of these issues previously 
reached" (Ross 2000). Clinton left office having tried to bribe the 
viequenses with 50 million dollars in federal aid to vote for continued live 
firing training. The new millennium would witness a resurgence of militan-
cy and virtual worldwide adverse reaction to the Navy's mistreatment of the 
people of Vieques. 
Vieques and George W. Bush 
In a strongly worded message delivered at the National Association of 
Hispanic Journalists on February 22. 2001, Governor Calderon called on 
President Bush to order an immediate cessation of training in Vieques. She 
cited as particularly urgent factors the environmental contamination and 
cancer death rates that surpass the island average by 44 percent. and cardio-
vascular death rate that exceeded by 60 percent the death rate in the rest of 
Puerto Rico (Garda 2001 ). On March 6. Resident Commissioner Acevedo-
Vila requested "President Bush to order the pennanent cessation of all 
bombing exercises in Vieques. Vieques is not a national security issue. It is 
a health and human rights issue" (Cong Rec. March 6, 2001 ). On March 8, 
200 I, 110 Democratic members of Congress sent Bush a letter requesting 
that he exercise his constitutional authority to immediately halt the bombing, 
and wrote that the issue of Vieques concerned health. environmental protec-
tion, and human rights of U.S. citizens. This rationale for the cessation of the 
bombing contrasted with the PNP's insistence that the key issue was colo-
nialism because it denied Puerto Ricans their civil rights and effective citi-
zenship. 
Calderon scored a partial victory when Secretary of Dcfcnst? Rumsfeld 
ordered the Navy to temporarily suspend military training operations sched-
uled for March 200 I after meeting with her and New York State Go\·ernor 
Pataki. In an attempt to further delay the bombing, the Puerto Rican gn\'-
ernment enacted legislation to enforce strict noise limits in order to prohihit 
ship-to-shore bombing and the sonic booms caused by naval aircraft (see 
CRS 2001 ). On April 24, 2001, Puetto Rico filed a federal lawsuit in District 
Cout1 alleging that Rumsfeld and the Navy violated Puerto Rico's law as 
well as the 1972 Federal Noise Control Act (Miller 2001). 3 Notwithstanding 
these victories, protest activity against the Navy continued to escalate in 
both the United States and Puerto Rico. Over 180 protesters were arrested in 
late April 200 I when they breached the security fences and occupied land in 
the restricted areas. Navy military police repeatedly fired rubber bullets and 
tear gas canisters at other protesters who were peacefully gathered outside 
the security zone (ACLU 2001).4 
The violence against the peaceful protesters did not intimidate the anti-
militarization movement. In fact, the abuse inspired notable public figures 
and celebrities from the United States to join the campaign. Many illegally 
entered the restricted area in Camp Garda and were arrested along side hun-
dreds of Puerto Rican protesters. Fonner PNP Secretary of State Norma 
Burgos, who had chaired Rossello's Special Commission, was arrested and 
\I~S N~1 ~ 2002 23 
CABAN/ BOMBS, BALLOTS, AND NATIONALISM 
given a two month jail sentence. U.S. District Judge Hector Laffitte, who 
seemed personally offended with the protesters' defiant violation of the law, 
imposed harsh jail sentences and set extraordinarily high bail. On May 25, 
2001, the New York Times editorialized that the punishments handed down 
by the judge seemed excessive. 
By the end of August 2001 over 1,400 people had been arrested. I~ages 
of burly, heavily anned, helmeted U.S. troopers attacking Puerto Rtca~s 
proved embarrassing to the Bush administration. On May 12, 200 l: Prest-
dent Bush unexpectedly announced during an interview on the Spamsh lan-
guage network Univisi6n that the time had come to "find a new base for the 
Navy to practice in." He went on to say, "We've got to continue working to 
fmd another solution-because the agreement that was reached before 
evidently is not satisfactory with the current government of Puerto Rico" 
(Eisman 2001). 
Bush's intention to have the Navy relinquish Vieques did not abate criti-
cism of his administration's treatment of the protesters. On May 24, 2001, 
Congressman Owns warned that "both the Navy and a Federal judge are 
blindly pursuing a policy ... of extremism. We should listen to the will of the 
people, not have a blind eye similar to the tanks that roll over the will of the 
people at Tiananmen Square'' (Cong Rec. May 24, 2001). AFL-CIO Presi-
dent Sweeny declared that "The Navy should be ashamed of the way its 
guards have behaved-from disgusting body searches, to the roughing up of 
demonstrators, to the verbal and physical abuse of workers who were arrest-
ed" (Sweeny July 6, 2001 ). The Puerto Rican Lawyers Guild released a 
report accusing the Navy and Federal District Court of applying excessive 
use of force to suppress and punish acts of civil disobedience and lawful 
demonstrations of free expression. The Congressional Hispanic Caucus held 
hearings on June 5, 2001, to examine allegations about the "'dehumanizing, 
degrading and punitive treatment received by those arrested at the hands of 
the United States Navy." Congresswomen Velasquez testified that "Naval 
military. police and U.S. Marshals displayed a total disregard for human 
well-betng by applying brutal force against thousands of its own citizens 
(CHC 2001 ). These actions were outrageous and have absolutely no place 
in our society." Senator Dodd shared his concerns about the "Overly harsh 
treatment of these protesters by the court" and noted that "continued civil 
disobedience is going to make the Navy's use of its facilities impossible" 
(Con Rec. July 20, 2001). 
But Democrats were deeply split on the Vieques issue. The liberal sector 
of the party, which included Hillary Rodham Clinton, Mario Cuomo, Robert 
F. Kennedy, Christopher Dodd, as well as Democratic National Committee 
Chairman Terry McAuliffe and all three Puerto Rican Congresspeople, Luis 
Gutierrez, Nydia Yehizquez, and Jose Serrano, were outspoken in their sup-
port for terminating Navy training in Yieques. Their criticism of the Navy 
and support for the protesters provoked a strong reaction from the conserva-
tive wing of the party, particularly congresspeople from southern and mid-
western states (Hernandez 2001 ). 
In a June 14, 200 1 press conference, President Bush announced that "the 
Navy ought to find somewhere else to conduct its exercises." He did so 
because "there· s been some harm done to people," and "these are our friends 
and neighbors and they don't want us there." Bush accepted Clinton's target 
date to halt all training by May 2003 (U.S. Office of the President 2001; New 
York Times June 15,2001 ). In a briefing on Yieques the following day, Secre-
tary of the Navy Gordon England provided other details which included the 
idea of rescinding the referendum authorized in Clinton's directive. While 
not acknowledging polls that indicated the residents of Yieques would vote 
in overwhelming numbers against the Navy, England claimed it was "very 
bad public policy- to have a referendum on issues critical to the Depart-
ment of the Navy ... and it sets very bad precedents." He indicated that he 
would seek relief to the law that authorized the referendum (U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense 2001 ). 
Bush's surprise announcement generated a strong reaction from the 
Navy's supporters in Congress. Stars and Stripes, a U.S. armed forces pub-
lication, reported that Republican lawmakers were incensed ("spitting 
nails") with Bush's decision. Legislators railed against the planned referen-
dum because "a mob of protesters can't be allowed to dictate how and where 
the military will train" (Jontz 2001 ). The New York Times reported that sen-
ior Navy and Marine officers felt betrayed and that they had been sold out 
by the White House which was "acting out of political expediency regard-
less of the cost to military readiness" (June 15, 2001 A09). 
The House Armed Services Committee hurriedly held hearings on June 
27, 200 l to assess the Yieques situation. According to Chairman Bob Stump, 
the "Yieques training range is an irreplaceable asset, the closure of which 
would severely damage the readiness of U.S. military forces" (U.S. House 
of Representatives June 27, 2001 ). Secretary Gordon testified he did not 
agree that Vieques was indispensable to military preparedness (England 
2001). In fact, the Navy Department was aware that Texas officials would 
soon announce that Laguna Madre could serve as a suitable alternative since 
the combined training exercises could be conducted on that site. The House 
Armed Services Committee would continue to resist Bush's call for the 
Navy to vacate Vieques. 
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Divisions within the Republican Party over Vieques were unmistakable. 
Republican Congressperson Wicker came to the administration's aid "a_s ?ne 
of a substantial number of Republicans who applaud" Bush for the decision. 
He challenged those who decried the supposed political nature of Bush's 
decision and asked whether "anyone realistically believes it is in our nation-
al interest to disregard, year after year, the overwhelming popular will of our 
United States citizens" (Cong Rec. June 19, 200 I). Stating that "New York 
and Puerto Rico are closely tied together," Governor George Pataki called 
for "a permanent ban on the bombing to end the nightmare the people of 
Vieques were living through" (Pataki 200 I). New Jersey Governor Donald 
DiFranceso also endorsed an immediate halt to the bombings, while the 
state's Republican-led Senate unanimously approved a resolution for the 
immediate cessation of the bombings. The battle over Vieques was not being 
fought only in Puerto Rico, neither was it simply a Republican Democratic 
partisan battle. Major fault Jines in the ideological, electoral, national secu-
rity and pork barrel spheres divided the political parties, and put a seeming-
ly pro-military Administration at odds with the senior military officer corps. 
The Puerto Rican government was not dissuaded by the Bush announce-
ment and held the nonbinding referendum as scheduled on July 29, 200 I. As 
had been projected, the vote was overwhelmingly for the immediate cessa-
tion of all training and for "the ouster of the Navy" from Yieques. 5 Two days 
later the House Armed Services Committee reaffirmed its position that 
"retaining the Vieques Island training facility is critical" for military readi-
ness. The committee included provisions to the National Defense Authori-
zation Act to cancel the referendum authorized by Clinton, to require con-
tinued training until an alternative site of equal or superior quality was locat-
ed, and if such a site were located to transfer Navy lands to the Department 
of the Interior (U.S. House Aug. 1, 2001 ). This represented the initial move 
by the Republican-controlled House toward abrogating Clinton's initiative 
on Vieques. Bush's decision on Vieques seems to have provoked a deavage 
in the party between right wing forces that endorsed patriotic militarism over 
all else and the advocates of political expediency that wanted to guarantee 
his reelection. 
Bush, Vieques, and the Latina/a Vote 
Why did Bush announce his intention to terminate Navy training in 
Vieques in 2003? The evidence from across the country seems indisputable; 
the Vieques issue resonates deeply with Latino and Latina constituencies 
nationwide and alienating them could cost the Republicans politically. The 
pundits agree that Bush made his Vieques decision in the hopes of increas-
--------
ing Latino support for the Republican Party in the long term. and to enhance 
his own prospects in the 2004 presidential elections. His advisors are con-
vinced that extending the Bush presidency into a second term requires dilut-
ing the Democratic Party's hold on the Latino electorate. According to the 
U.S. Census, the "Hispanic" population numbered 22.4 million in 1990; in 
2000 the population had increased by 58 percent to 35.3 million. Despite 
his substantial Latino support in Texas (about 50 per cent of Latinos voted 
for Bush as governor), Bush gained 34 per cent of the national Latino vote, 
3 percentage points less than Ronald Reagan. Eleven million Latinas and 
Latinos are expected to cast their ballots in the 2004 presidential elections. 
If they vote in the same proportion as they did in the 2000 presidential 
elections, George W. Bush is expected to lose the national vote by 3 million 
ballots (Keen and Benedetto 2001 ). 
Karl Rove, Bush's chief political strategist, analyzes how major policy 
decisions could influence the voters in particular constituencies that are crit-
ical to the president's reelection. Rove was certain that Vieques was a make-
or-break political issue for Bush. His thinking on this may have been influ-
enced by prominent Washington lobbyist and Republican strategist Charles 
Black, who was retained by the Calderon administration. Black emphasized 
that "the problem would not go away," and that Bush would need to settle 
the Vieques issue (Campo- Flores 2001 ). Rove purportedly convinced Bush 
that the outcome of the Vieques debacle would have a major impact on 
Latino electoral support for his reelection. 
Rove's maneuver was a preemptive move not only to blunt the widening 
criticism of the administration, but to frustrate a loosely organized and 
increasingly effective movement that rebuked Bush's actions and threatened 
to embarrass and politically damage him. The Democrats saw an opportuni-
ty in the Vieques debacle to assail the Bush administration for its treatment 
of Latinos. The Democratic National Committee was particularly critical of 
Bush and his ofticials, whom it faulted for being guilty of "bully tactic pol-
itics as well as their blatant disregard of the will of the people." DNC chief 
McCauliffe disparaged Bush for refusing to acknowledge that "the people of 
Vieques have contributed for 60 years to protecting our nation's defense." 
Citing deplorable electoral irregularities in Florida during the presidential 
election, McAuliffe decried the treatment of Puerto Rico where "we are 
once again seeing the administration's penchant for disenfranchising Latino 
voters" (DNC July 28, 2001 ). 
The growth of the Latino electorate in key electoral states and its evolv-
ing political diversity were factors that influenced the Bush administration's 
thinking on how to resolve the Vieques crisis. Large scale Puerto Rican 
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migration to Florida, particularly to Orlando and Orange Counties, and 
increased Mexican migration to Tampa since the mid-1980s, have dimin-
ished the electoral significance of the heavily Republican Cuban-American 
community in the state. Although Puerto Ricans have voted overwhelming-
ly for the Democratic Party, Bush's advisors expect that a favorable resolu-
tion of the Vieques debacle might precipitate enough defections to lead to a 
Republican victory in Florida. Recent important elections reveal that Latinos 
no longer reflexively cast their votes for Democrats. The candidates' posi-
tions on issues of critical importance to Latinos, as well as perceptions of 
their sensitivity to Latino cultural and linguistic identities, will influence the 
vote. In New York, Rodham Clinton, Pataki, and New York City Mayor 
Michael Bloomberg were all acutely aware of the inescapable Latino elec-
toral advance and consciously sought to fortify their ties with the communi-
ty. All three are strong advocates for immediate termination of Navy train-
ing in Vieques. The implications of Republican Bloomberg's surprising 
mayoral victory over liberal Democratic Mark Green in the heavily Demo-
cratic New York City are not lost on Bush's strategists. 
As if to dramatize that her administration has the capacity to affect elec-
tions in the United States, Calder6n announced on December 13, 200 I that 
the Puerto Rican government, through its offices in major U.S. cities, would 
initiate a massive voter registration drive. The objective is to influence the 
outcome of the 2002 Congressional elections by targeting the approximate-
ly 600,000 Puerto Ricans residing in the United States who are eligible, but 
are not registered to vote. The timing of the announcement was not coinci-
dental and seemed to convey the implicit threat of an electoral challenge to 
the Republicans (Puerto Rico Herald December 13, 2001 ). 
Bush's decision on Vieques is part of a larger Republican strategy to gar-
ner Latino support in key swing states. But, beyond finding an equitable res-
olution of the Vieques debacle, the GOP will have to make significant ideo-
logical modifications of its domestic policy if it is ever to gain substantial 
adherents in the national Latino electorate, an electorate that overwhelming-
ly sees itself as a racialized community that has been historically marginal-
ized and as predominately working-class and poor. In many respects very 
similar to the poor residents of Vieques. 
Vieques and September 11 
A week before the terrorist attacks of September 11, Calder6n an-
nounced that the federally mandated referendum would be held in 
November. While opposed to the referendum since it did not provide for the 
immediate cessation of the bombing, Calderon argued that she was consti-
tutionally obligated to uphold the federal law. Subsequently, Calderon chose 
to endorse the referendum since it was the only legal means available to 
impose a date (on or before May 2003) for terminating Navy use of Vieques. 
However, on September 24, 200 1, the Bush administration official\ y moved 
to seek relief from the law that authorized the referendum. It objected to the 
Senate version of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fail-
ing to cancel the referendum which the administration ·•considered set a bad 
precedent and strikes at the heart of military preparedness" (Office of 
Management and Budget 2001 ). 
The amended NDAA version of December 12, 200 I, called for the "ter-
mination of referendum requirement regarding continuation of military 
training on the island of Vieques." The Secretary of the Navy was authorized 
to close the Vieques base only upon certifying that he had secured compara-
ble or superior locations for training. According to committee chairperson 
Stump, the bill "places the thorny issue" of Vieques "in the hands of Navy 
officials and out of the political realm" (U.S. House Dec. 13, 2001 ). The 
Bush administration had effectively nullified the Clinton directive, which 
had had the force of law, and substituted a legally unenforceable policy for 
terminating Navy activities in Vieques. Assuming the Navy does choose to 
relocate its training to another site, the law authorizes the transfer of military 
lands in Vieques to the federal government and does not provide for cleanup 
of the toxic waste that pollutes the training site (see Vieques Libre ). 
Democrat Congressman Rahall voted against the NDAA and condemned 
the provisions on Vieques since it was "a major retrenchment" from the 
Clinton directive and because it "harkens back to the age of colonialism'' 
( Cong Rec. Dec. 13, 2001 ). Congressmen Engel and Baca agreed that the 
new legislation can permit Navy training past May 2003. In separate March 
19, 2002 letters to President Bush, they urge him to "issue an Executive 
Order that formalizes the Navy's commitment for an end to bombing and 
other training operations in Vieques." They noted that President Ford issued 
an order for the immediate and permanent cessation of military activity in 
Culebra, and that President Bush, Sr. had done the same for Kaho'olawe, 
Hawaii in 1990 (see Vieques-Libre 2002). 
By the beginning of 2002 Calderon appeared to be losing support in 
some quarters of the Vieques movement. Her decision to authorize deploy-
ment of the Puerto Rican Maritime Police to guard the perimeter of Camp 
Garda was roundly criticized. The PIP accused her of "betrayal" for coop-
erating with the federal authorities and berated her as an "accomplice" of 
the Navy for her administration's unexpected quiescence on Vieques. The 
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CPRDV reproofed her for helping the Navy prosecute the war against 
Vieques. On January 2, 2002, a federal judge dismissed Calderon's lawsuit 
to enjoin the Navy from resuming its training on Vieques. After the court rul-
ing the CPRDV and other organizations announced that they would conduct 
not only disobedience, but "protest event~" in Puerto Rico and the United 
States. Calderon seemed to have endorsed this strategy when she stated that 
"the will of the people of Puerto Rico and our resistance as a society" were 
the only resources available to prevent Naval bombardment of Vieques, and 
referred to the protesters as heroes (Colon Diaz 2002). 
Despite the legal set back, Calderon announced on January 8, 2002 that 
Navy Secretary England had canceled the training exercises scheduled for 
the end of the month. In a press release she called on the "people of Puerto 
Rico to maintain their unity of purposes" (Estado Libre Asociado 2002). 
The following day she reported that President Bush had personally reaf-
firmed "his commitment to halt military practices on Vieques by or before 
2003." She told reporters that "I return to Puerto Rico inspired by the words 
of the president" (Delgado 2002). The respite from bombing may be short-
lived. On March 15, 2002, the Navy Department, which remains adamantly 
opposed to relinquishing its training facility, informed Puerto Rican 
Secretary of State Ferdinand Mercardo that military exercises with non-
explosive ordnance would begin on April 1. The PIP urged Puerto Ricans to 
engage in a massive campaign of civil disobedience to resist the bombing. 
CPRDV announced that it would coordinate protest actions and denuncia-
tions, while other activists announced that they would undertake civil dis-
obedience, invade the firing area, and serve as human shields. 
Calderon's paradox is the paradox of Puerto Rico under the current colo-
nial status. While Calderon extols the protesters as heroes and eloquently 
expresses her admiration for their struggles to achieve human rights, as gov-
ernor she has taken an oath of loyalty to the federal government which obli-
gates her to enforce its laws. As an agent of the state the governor cannot 
endorse civil disobedience of federal legislation, no matter if it is judged by 
Puerto Rican society as morally repugnant. Lacking formal representation in 
Congress her government has resorted to an array of political maneuvers to 
affect policy. Although permanently barred from the halls of power in 
Washington, D.C., Calderon, as all Puerto Rican governors before her, has 
proven adept at orchestrating multiple points of political pressure on the fed-
eral government; whether it is hiring Washington insiders as lobbyists to 
influence policy makers, filing legal challenges to halt the bombing, pub-
licly imploring the Navy to respect human rights, appealing to the Puerto 
Rican and Latino community in the United States, or negotiating for the sup-
port of U.S. politicians who believe that she can deliver the stateside Puerto 
Rican vote. But, ultimately. the Estado Libre Asociado [literally, Free Asso-
ciated State]- as the colony of Puerto Rico is formally called-lacks the 
constitutional basis to protect the rights and property of Puerto Ricans who 
are U.S. citizens. Calderon's legal attempts to restrict the Navy have been 
rebuffed by the federal courts, poignantly revealing the futility of a colony 
attempting to employ the empire's laws against itself. The Navy Depart-
ment's repudiation of the July referendum, the Senate and House leaders' 
disdainful and insulting dismissals of Puerto Rico's various petitions, the 
Bush administration's devious evisceration of the Clinton-Rossello accords 
-including cancellation of a federal law authorizing a referendum on 
Vieques' future-convincingly demonstrate ways in which colonial power 
is exercised. Like Munoz Marin, her predecessor four decades earlier, 
Calderon can only resort to appeals for fairness and equity from the Presi-
dent of the United States to protect the inhabitants of Vieques. 
When queried about Calderon's handling of the Vieques debacle, 
Fernando Martfn, executive president of the PIP. pointedly observed that 
"the humiliation to which Puerto Rico has been subjected has made even 
more evident the problems between Puerto Rico and the United States" 
(Puerto Rico Herald December 19, 2001 ). 
Conclusion 
The battle for Vieques embodies a number of issues that resonate deeply 
with many sectors of U.S. society. The nature of the struggle-a poor, polit-
ically disenfranchised people who are literally waging a life and death bat-
tle against a callous military agency- touches a collective moral chord. But 
while this moral basis for resistance is irrefutable, it was ultimately the 
relentless, creative, and courageous campaign that moved many other organ-
izations and individuals to join the social movement to liberate Vieques. 
Historically portrayed as a local issue of limited scope, the battle for Vieques 
has emerged as a national-based movement for civil and human rights. The 
Vieques community deliberately avoided depicting colonial domination as 
the exceptional factor to explain their oppression. By representing the plight 
of Vieques as denial of citizenship rights and abuse of poor people, the 
struggle took on an ethic that resonated deeply with other vulnerable and 
ignored communities, as well as advocates of social justice and responsible 
government. 
The Vieques movement demonstrates that the absence of legal channels 
for representation does not preclude social movements from affecting the 
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policy process. The ability to develop and coordinate the activities of dozens 
of organizations, to effectively employ a variety of informational sources to 
internationalize the cause, to work with solidarity networks nationally and 
internationally, to marshal substantial political support from elected offi-
cials, and to establish strategic alliances that transcend the limitations of par-
tisan politics, constitutes a new challenge to colonialism. The campaign to 
demilitarize Vieques has ultimately served to recast Puerto Rican identity as 
an intrinsic constituent of a larger, national Latino movement that empha-
sizes civil and human rights and equal citizenship. In the process it has 
helped to further dispel myths that portray Puerto Ricans as incapable of 
unity and lacking agency. 
Notes 
1. I would like to express my gratitude to Amilcar Barreto for providing me with 
galleys of his excellent new study, Vieques, the Navy and Puerto Rican Politics. 
(Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2002). 
2. Romero Barcel6 complained that "the hallmark of Puerto Rico's relationship 
with the Navy has been one of broken promises; when time and time again, 
despite pledges and commitments to the contrary, the Navy has ignored, lied 
and flagrantly failed to meet the obligations to which they adhered by signing 
the Memorandum of Understanding of 1983" (1999). 
3. The Clinton-Rossell6 plan was enacted in law on October 30, 2000 as P.L. 106-
246 and P.L. 106-398, which authorized 40 million dollars for conducting the 
referendum and other community and economic assistance projects. 
4. Federal Judge Gladys Kessler dismissed the lawsuit on January l, 2002. The 
ACLU filed suit in U.S. Federal District Court on June 18, 2001 for a perma-
nent injunction "to prevent a recurrence of the events of April 27 through April 
29, 2001, when heavily armed Naval personnel in riot gear, and without justifi-
cation or authority, dispersed hundreds of lawfully assembled protesters-
including many young children attending a clown show-by firing upon them 
with chemical agents and other non-deadly weapons, such as rubber bullets and 
pellet-filled impact bags fired from shotguns. Scores of people were injured and 
required medical assistance" ( ACLU June 18, 2001 ). 
5. Of the 4,766 votes cast, 68.2 percent were for Option 2, "Immediate and per-
manent ceasing of the military exercises and bombings by the Navy on Vieques. 
The ouster of the Navy from Vieques, the cleaning and return of the land of 
Vieques to its people." 
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